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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the evolution of the 
treatment of comparative advertising in Argentina‘s courts.**  
Argentina lacked, and still lacks, a statute that specifically 
regulates the subject matter.  Therefore, courts are forced to apply 
norms about trademark law,
1
 fair trade rules,
2
 self-regulatory 
advertising,
3
 and unfair competition
4
 in order to establish the legal 
boundaries for comparisons of products or services provided by a 
competitor. 
In the last four decades, more than fifteen decisions have 
progressively permitted comparisons of products, established clear 
standards and abandonded the strict rule that the mere mention of 
another brand constituted trademark infringement.
5
  The aim of 
this paper is to expose which ideas and legal principles Argentine 
judges have begun to embrace in order to facilitate and clarify the 
legality of product comparisons in the competitive advertising 
process. 
I. EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINA‘S CASE LAW 
What follows is an analysis of the most important comparative 
advertising cases decided in Argentina.
6
 
 
**  This article was originally written in Spanish and was translated by staff and editors 
of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal for the 
purposes of publication.  The quoted material has all been translated into English.   
 1 See Law No. 22.362, Dec. 26, 1980 (Arg.), available at http://www.wipo.int 
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=209924 (―Law on Trademarks and Designations‖). 
 2 See Law No. 22.802, May 19, 1983 (Arg.), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=224922 (―Fair Trade Law‖). 
 3 See Code of Ethics and Self-Advertising, CONARP, http://www.conarp.org.ar/ 
codigo.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). 
 4 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10, Mar. 20, 1883, 
21 U.S.T. 1583; CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 953 (Arg.) (applied by courts due to lack of a general 
law on unfair competition).  
 5 In some cases, the mere inference of a trademark, without even mentioning it, was 
considered trademark infringement.  
 6 Due to a lack of space, it is not possible to comment on all the relevant cases, but it 
is fitting to clarify that many were preventive measures where the issue of comparative 
advertising was considered extensively, or where the arguments were more factual than 
legal, or where general concepts on the subject matter were repeated without deepening 
or establishing new ideas.  Therefore, I have excluded these cases from my analysis, only 
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A. Relojes Rolex Argentina v. Orient 
This case pitted Rolex against Orient regarding an 
advertisement made for the watch ―Orient‖ which used the name, 
brand, emblem, and photograph of the well-known watch 
 
briefly mentioning and summarizing them in the conclusion so readers can extend their 
research if they so wish.  These cases are: Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y 
Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and 
Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 30/06/2005, ―Clorox 
Argentina S.A. c. Reckitt Benckiser Argentina S.A. s/medidas cautelares‖ Citar Lexis 
(7/15825) (Reckit Benckinser promoted their liquid stain-remover ―Vanish‖ in an 
advertisement which stated, ―not with lavandina because it damages cloth,‖ showing a 
torn, discolored, and deteriorated tablecloth. The plaintiff promoted its product 
―Lavandina Activa‖ as bleach and alleged that the advertisement was disparaging its 
trademark and product; the injunction was denied.); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en 
lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of 
Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2001, ―Japan 
Tobacco Inc. y otro c. Massalin Particulares S.A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (2001-E-596) (Arg.) 
(the defendant responded to an advertisement using English terms with an advertisement 
that contained a humorous tone and mocked the presumed American origin of the 
plaintiff‘s cigarettes, which were actually imported from Uruguay; the advertisement did 
not constitute unfair competition, nor did it disparage the competitor); Cámara Nacional 
de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 
19/04/2001, ―Gougenheim S.A. c. Bimbo de Argentina S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina 
[J.A.] (2003-I-469) (fleeting use of a competitor‘s trademark in a television commercial; 
claim denied in both instances due to lack of trademark use); Cámara Nacional de 
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 3 [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 3], 
27/9/2000, ―Clorox Argentina S.A. c. Unilever de Argentina S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia 
Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-327) (the product CIF from Unilever was compared to Clorox‘s 
bleach known as ―Ayudin‖; injunctive relief was originially granted, but revoked on 
appeal); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, 
sala 2 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 2], 24/02/2000, ―Unilever de Argentina S.A. c. Procter & Gamble 
Interamericas Inc.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-318) (the defendant‘s 
advertisement compared the efficiency of Ariel cleaning products and soap in the form of 
tablets.  There was no mention of the brand of products compared with Ariel.  Skip, the 
plaintiff‘s product, was the only detergent soap in tablet form; an injunction prohibiting 
the commercial was granted); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial 
de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial 
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 13/6/1996, ―Demibell S.A. c. Deville 
S.R.L.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1997-B-67) (Arg.) (a model who had appeared in Demibel 
advertisements for several years appeared in a new commercial for competitor Deville, 
stating ―. . . now I use Deville . . . .‖ and ―Deville is my new weakness;‖ it was 
determined that the advertisement did not constitute unfair competition, nor did it 
degrade the competitor). 
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―Rolex.‖7  The intent of the advertisement was to introduce the 
new watch to the market by implying that it had the same level of 
quality as Rolex, while highlighting its lower price and longer 
warranty.
8
  In other words, the advertisement compared Orient to 
Rolex.  Relojes Rolex Argentina S.A. sued Orient and the 
advertising agency for damages allegedly derived from the 
advertisement.
9
   
The Court of First Instance rejected the claim.
10
  While the ad 
did not strictly fall under the trademark statute, the court found that 
the ad did violate article 953 of the Civil Code, governing unfair 
competition.
11
  However, Rolex was unable to show any proof of 
damages because Rolex had neither engaged in a counter-
advertising campaign, nor suffered a decrease in the sale of 
―Rolex‖ watches, and therefore the unfair competition claim was 
dismissed.
12
  Moreover, Rolex‘s moral damages claim13 was also 
rejected because Rolex had not specifically registered its brand or 
the use of its watches.
14
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling with some 
modification.
15
  For the Court of Appeals, this was an act of 
advertising contrary to honest commercial practices and good faith.  
The court ruled that, even though the dishonest practice itself did 
not generate the right to reparation without proof of damages, 
judges should be more lenient on the issue of damages because the 
 
 7 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
2, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 2], 30/12/1971, ―Relojes Rolex Argentina S.A. c. Orient S.A. y otro,‖ 
Jurisprudencia Argentina Contemporary Section [J.A.] (1972-14). 
 8 Id. at Part 1. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at Part 2. 
 12 Id. 
 13 The term moral damage is commonly used in civil law jurisdictions to ―designate 
damage inflicted to interests or assets that are not patrimonial in nature.‖ Saul Litvinoff, 
Moral Damages, 38 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977).  The typical examples of moral damages are 
pain and suffering for libel or slander, or due to identity theft, or reputational damages. 
 14 Rolex, at Part 2. 
 15 Id. 
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consumer deception is a very subtle element and very difficult to 
prove.
16
  The court concluded that:  
[T]he mere act of having carried out comparative 
advertising carries the presumption that there is a 
damage caused by attracting customers and, 
therefore, one should refer to paragraph 165 of the 
Procedural Code
17
 to determine the damages, since 
expecting a complete and detailed evaluation of the 
amount of damages is quite difficult.
18
 
B. Bodegas Edmundo Navarro Correas v. Agro Industrias 
Cartellone 
This case arose from a television commercial.  The 
advertisement features two glasses in front of various bottles, the 
shapes, forms and colors of which signify specific renowned 
wines.  The plaintiff‘s wine, Navarro Correas pinot noir, is shown, 
identifiable only by the shape of its bottle.
19
  The camera moves 
until the two glasses are facing a bottle of Saint Valery (the 
defendant‘s wine), and they bow repeatedly, as if welcoming the 
new wine.
20
  The commercial lasts forty-two seconds and aired on 
the country‘s most popular channels.21  Navarro Correas sued, 
contending that the advertisement was illegal because a bottle 
depicting its wine was shown.
22
  The plaintiff‘s bottle only 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 The procedural code states that ―when a decision of a judge orders the payment of a 
sum of money, interests and damages, the quantity will be established in liquid money or 
will at least establish the principals on which the liquidation will take place . . . .  The 
ruling will determine the amount of the credit or the damages claimed, as long as their 
existence is legally checked . . . .‖ CÓDIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACIÓN 
[CÓD. PROC. CIV. Y COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERICAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 165 (Arg.).  
 18 Relojes Rolex v. Orient.  
 19 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 23/3/1991, ―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S. A. c. Agro 
Industrias Cartellone S. A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1991-C-531) (Arg.). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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appeared for a fraction of a second and it was impossible to clearly 
read the words written on it.
23
 
The court rejected the claim.
24
  The court held that the use of 
the mark was atypical
25
 and therefore the commercial was legal.
26
  
It also ruled that the plaintiff‘s product was in no way disparaged 
and that it was impossible to identify the plaintiff‘s brands when 
the advertisement was played at normal speed.
27
 
Judge Perez Delgado‘s opinion in this case created a rule that 
transformed the general principle of comparative advertising in 
Argentina.  He pointed out that: 
[O]ne must distinguish between the use of another 
brand without authorization as if it is one‘s own 
from the mere reference or mention of said brand 
recognizing it is another owned brand, since, while 
in the first case there will always be an infringement 
of trademark rights, in the second it will depend on 
the circumstances of each individual case, since the 
reference to another brand can constitute a 
legitimate action when another‘s ownership is 
recognized and that the aim is not about disparaging 
or discrediting the other. . . .  [T]he mere mention or 
evocation of another brand, or even of comparative 
advertising, is not in itself forbidden in our legal 
system, insofar as the legitimate rights of the 
owner
28
 are not infringed upon. . . .  [W]hat the law 
seeks to avoid is the exploitation of another brand, 
without the owner‘s authorization, to distinguish 
 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id.  The theory of atypical use of a mark was not fully developed at that time.  An 
atypical use of a tradmark is use that does not fit under the traditional contours of 
trademark infringement but can be considered legal or illegal depending on the 
circumstances.  The theory was fully developed in 1999 with an article written by 
Guillermo Cabanellas. See generally Guillermo Cabanellas, El Uso Atípico de Marca 
Ajena [Atypical Use of Another’s Trademark] in TEMAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y DE LA 
COMPETENCIA 39–77 (Ernesto Aracama-Zorraquín ed.) (1999) (Arg.). 
 26 Navarro Correas. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.  
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products and services.  But these provisions, in my 
opinion, do not reach the hypothesis where these 
products and services are not identified with another 
brand, but instead are only used as a reference to the 
already existing products and services, such as the 
case we must examine here . . . .
29
 
The judge then continued to clarify that ―none of the owners‘ 
rights or legitimate interests are breached if another party merely 
shows the existence of their brand.‖30  Applying these rules, the 
judge watched the commercial and reasoned that there was nothing 
degrading about the glasses (representing the consumers) bowing 
for the new wine as a sign of welcome, while not bowing towards 
other wines.  The fleeting appearance, for a fraction of a second, of 
the plaintiff‘s wine could not constitute illicit trademark use.31 
Judge Farrell joined judge Perez Delgado‘s opinion.32  After 
watching the commercial several times—the way a consumer does 
(not frame by frame, as was proposed by the dissenting vote)—
Judge Farrell admitted that, although the video can be subject to 
different interpretations, there was no denigration of the 
competitors‘ wines.33  He stressed that the appearance of a new 
wine could involve possible sales that affect the sales of other 
wines, impairing them, but clarified that ―this effect on the market 
is considered perfectly legal.‖34 
Judge Craviotto‘s dissenting vote focused on the distinction 
between competitors in the video (whose identities could be 
distinguished if watched frame by frame)
35
 and stated clearly that 
 
 29 Id.  In subsequent cases, mark-owning plaintiffs will try to prove violation of 
trademark law, unfair competition rules and ethical publicity standards to try to 
demonstrate that, in the challenged commercial, the line between the mere reference and 
explicit use of another person‘s trademark was crossed.  Without a doubt, the holding of 
this case was a novelty for the trademark practitioner in Argentina who was accustomed 
to very few limitations on the property right in a trademark.  In contrast to other legal 
systems, Argentine law still does not contain clear limitations on trademark rights. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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comparative advertising was generally prohibited in Argentina, 
making the advertising in question illegal.
36
  However, because the 
plaintiff could not prove the causal link between the unlawful ad 
and the decline in sales, the claim had to be dismissed.
37
 
C. Axoft Argentina v. Megasistemas 
Megasistemas controlled the distribution of the software 
―Tango,‖ a property of Axoft, in 1989 and 1990.38  When its 
commercial relationship with Axoft ended, Megasistemas 
published an advertisement during the main information 
technology fair in Buenos Aires, reporting that it would thereafter 
distribute the software ―Stradivarius,‖ which, according to the ad, 
was ―simply superior.‖39   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ad‘s subtitle expressed that in 1990 they had presented 
―Tango‖ and that now in 1991, they were introducing 
 
 36 Id.  The dissent maintained that: ―Comparative advertising is inadmissible in the 
present state of legislation—by itself, without injury to the competitor—because what is 
being challenged par excellence is the public consumers.‖ Id.  Despite its strong words 
and intense review of comparative law, the dissent did not cite any written law to defend 
this theory.  This further highlights the need for more severe regulations. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y 
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, 
courtroom 1], 30/12/1993, ―Axoft Argentina Inc. c.  Megasistemas, Inc.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] 
(1994-C-8) (Arg.).  
 39 Id. 
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―Stradivarius,‖ detailing a list of eighteen services the new 
program offered that the previous one lacked.
40
  In small print, the 
advertisement clarified who owned each of the brands.
41
 
Axoft sued, petitioning for cessation of the use of their brand 
and publication of the judge‘s decision in the same journal that 
published the ad.
42
  The appellate court accepted the claim.
43
  
Judge Perez Delgado—this time with Judge Craviotto‘s 
agreement—recalled his vote in Navarro Correas, but clarified 
that the facts were different here.
44
  His vote emphasized that the 
mere mention of another brand was not illegal as there was no 
slander, discrediting, or injury to the legitimate trademark right‘s 
owner;
45
 such behavior would have been reprehensible because of 
the previous existing relationship between the parties and the 
inclusion of a direct comparison to the previous program.
46
 
The court held that the defendant  
tried to spread the idea that their product was 
superior and had greater range, which in fact made 
it a misleading advertisement, since unilaterally and 
without the owner‘s consent to the use of the 
trademark they split the brand, highlighting only 
one of its applications and omitting another 
complementary one, that, had it been considered, 
would not have helped them to point out the 
weaknesses revealed in the advertisement.
47
   
 
 40 Two columns compared the features of each program, such as whether it handled 
two currencies, whether it was multiuser, whether it had different ways of dealing with 
the different classes of taxes, etc.  In each category, Stradivarius had a ―yes‖ while Tango 
3.2. always had a ―no.‖ Id. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 The Court referenced the regular correspondence between the parties, which proved 
that various aspects of Tango were omitted (which completed the functions that the 
advertisement omitted).  Considering that in this case the defendant was the plaintiff‘s 
previous distributor and knew the software perfectly well, the omissions of the 
comparison were held to be deliberate and in bad faith. Id. 
 47 Id. 
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The court even made a reference to a non-binding statement of 
the Commission of Self-Regulating Advertising.
48
  Addressing the 
same ad campaign, this private entity also decided against the 
plaintiff, maintaining that the challenged advertisement violated 
the Ethical Code of Self-Regulating Advertising and petitioned the 
agency that created the advertisement to cancel its airing. 
D. Coca Cola v. Pepsi 
This case pitted Coca Cola against Pepsi Cola in a comparative 
advertising claim involving a public taste-test.
49
  Pepsi, in its 
―Pepsi Challenge‖ campaign, offered street audiences a taste of 
each company‘s product—without identifying either—at various 
places throughout Buenos Aires.
50
  The taster revealed his or her 
selection by uncovering the bottle of the drink that the consumer 
preferred.  The survey was recorded and later televised; known 
presenter Julian Weich explained the Pepsi Challenge, and then 
declared that the public had chosen Pepsi.
51
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 Id.  
 49 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of 
Justice], 12/9/1995, ―The Coca Cola Company c. Pepsi Cola Argentina / varios propieded 
industrial‖ (Coca Cola IV) La Ley [L.L.] (1995-E-338) (Arg.). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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In subsequent commercial, without expressly mentioning Coca 
Cola, the same presenter stated: ―due to rules that prohibit 
comparative advertising, we will not mention the brand, nor show 
the container of our competition.  But it doesn‘t matter because 
you know which it is . . .‖52  Coca Cola initiated an injunctive 
relief action petitioning for the cessation of the Pepsi Challenge.
53
 
The judge in the first instance found himself without 
jurisdiction.  Instead of a trademark law claim, which would grant 
jurisdiction to the federal civil and commercial courts, the judge 
ruled that the issue was one of unfair competition because it 
focused on the advertising campaign.
54
  Coca Cola appealed the 
decision.  The Court of Appeals overturned the decision, finding 
that the court had jurisdiction to intervene in the case.
55
  The Court 
of Appeals also decided on the injunctive relief requested, but not 
granted, in the lower court.
56
  The Court of Appeals granted the 
request, ―ordering [Pepsi] to immediately cease the advertising 
campaign known as Pepsi Challenge,‖ including notices of any 
kind, survey stands, and posters.
57
 
In discontinuing the Pepsi Challenge, the court maintained that 
Pepsi was conducting a ―masked comparative ad‖ campaign; 
although Coca Cola was not expressly mentioned in the campaign, 
it obviously referred to Coca Cola, Pepsi‘s only competitor.58  The 
campaign had used the brand Coca Cola to garner public support, 
―taking advantage of its notoriety, as a way of glorifying, through 
 
 52 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
II [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 2], 22/10/93, ―The Coca Cola Company c. Pepsi Cola Argentina‖ 
(Coca Cola I), La Ley [L.L.] (1994-C-3) (Arg.). 
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
III [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 3], 01/11/1993, ―The Coca Cola Company y otros‖ (Coca Cola II), La 
Ley [L.L.] (1994-C-6) (Arg.). 
 56 See id.  The injunction decision was followed by a recusal motion by Pepsi‘s 
lawyers; the recusal was also denied. 
 57 Coca Cola I. 
 58 Id. ¶ 10. 
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the challenge, the superiority of its own product, in a clear example 
of comparative advertising.‖59 
In the judges‘ opinion, the case presented an interference with 
or use of another party‘s trademark, removing the owner‘s 
exclusive control of the commercial image and ownership of the 
commercial message.
60
  The Court twice relied on Rolex v. 
Orient
61
 to illustrate a presumption of damages where, on the 
grounds of the second paragraph of Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, a direct or 
indirect use of another‘s brand may be illegal and contrary to 
honest practice in commercial matters.
62
 
Faced with the injunction, Pepsi appealed to the Supreme 
Court.
63
  The extraordinary appeal was granted, authorizing the 
continuation of the campaign.  The Supreme Court granted the 
appeal because the Court of Appeals had decided on an issue that 
had not been decided by the Court of First Instance: the supposed 
unlawfulness of the advertisement at hand.  On this ground, the 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment made by the Court of 
Appeals.
64
 
Following the Supreme Court‘s ruling, Pepsi was free to 
continue the campaign.  When the Pepsi Challenge started again,
65
 
Coca Cola requested another injunction, but was denied by the 
Court of First Instance because ―granting the petition for injunction 
would imply prior restraint, forbidden by Art. 14 of the National 
 
 59 Id. ¶ 11. 
 60 Id. ¶ 12. 
 61 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
2, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 2], 30/12/1971, ―Relojes Rolex Argentina S.A. c. Orient S.A. y otro,‖ 
Jurisprudencia Argentina Contemporary Section [J.A.] (1972-14). 
 62 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10 bis (2), March 20, 
1883 as revised July 14 ,1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (―Any act of competition contrary to 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair 
competition.‖). 
 63 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of 
Justice], 12/9/1995, Coca Cola IV La Ley [L.L.] (1995-E-338) (Arg.). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Both companies moved the judicial duel to the media by publishing their 
perspectives on the case in the main newspapers of the country. 
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Constitution.‖66  The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision 
without reaching the question of law, stating that the requisites for 
an injunction had not been met.
67
  The Supreme Court denied the 
appeal.
68
 
In the meantime, Coca Cola had begun a trademark lawsuit 
against Pepsi.
69
  Coca Cola argued that its trademark was visible 
for a fraction of a second.  It also argued that the shape of its bottle 
was a trademark.  Coca Cola petitioned for the definitive cessation 
of the advertising campaign and requested that damages be 
awarded jointly and severally against Pepsi and the advertising 
agency.
70
 
The Court of First Instance denied the claim. The judge 
concluded that the use of Coca Cola‘s trademark in this 
comparative advertising campaign was legal and that there was no 
bad faith in Pepsi‘s campaign;71 the contested conduct was not 
unlawful, and therefore the advertising campaign was deemed 
legitimate.
72
 
In reaching this conclusion, the judge stated: 
It is clear that at no point in time did Pepsi intend to 
distinguish its own product from that of the 
plaintiff, which is in fact prohibited by law. 
Therefore, what is being dealt with here is not the 
use of another person‘s trademark but its mention[;] 
although it was included, it was a mere insinuation, 
 
 66 Art. 14, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (―All the inhabitants of the 
Nation are entitled to the following rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their 
exercise, namely: to work and perform any lawful industry; to navigate and trade; to 
petition the authorities; to enter, remain in . . . travel through, and leave the Argentine 
territory; to publish their ideas through the press without previous censorship; to make 
use and dispose of their property; to associate for useful purposes; to profess freely their 
religion; to teach and to learn.‖). 
 67 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
2, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 2], Causa No. 7982, 15/9/1995, ―Coca Cola Co. c. Pepsi Cola‖ (Coca 
Cola III) (Arg.).  
 68 Coca Cola IV. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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since the bottle that presumably belonged to the 
plaintiff appeared hidden in the television ads.  
However, for that reason in itself, even though it 
was not expressly mentioned, the mention is 
implicit, since there is no other widely known brew 
similar to that of the defendant other than the 
plaintiff‘s.73 
By applying the holding of the Navarro Correas judgment,
74
 
the judge maintained: 
The reference to another person‘s trademark—even 
implicitly—is central to comparative advertising, 
which forms the basis of the complaint in this 
case . . . .  But the issue with these types of ads 
transcends that which is infringement of trademark 
law, which leads to the conclusion that the 
campaign being examined by the plaintiffs did not 
undergo any unwarranted use of the trademarks 
registered by [Coca-Cola].  What drives us to the 
heart of the case is the question of whether we are 
in the presence of comparative advertising and the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of this type of 
advertising.
75
 
Afterwards, the judge cited the principle included in Art. 19 of 
the Argentine Constitution that ―no one is obligated to do what the 
law does not order.‖ 76  The judge deemed this principle applicable 
to legal entities as well as persons.  In reviewing the laws 
potentially applicable to the case (commercial loyalty, the laws of 
unfair competition found in Paris Convention Art.10 bis, and the 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 23/3/1991, ―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S. A. c. Agro 
Industrias Cartellone S. A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1991-C-531) (Arg.). 
 75 Coca Cola IV. 
 76 Art. 19, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (―The private actions of 
men which in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are only 
reserved to God and are exempted from the authority of judges.  No inhabitant of the 
Nation shall be obliged to perform what the law does not demand nor deprived of what it 
does not prohibit.‖). 
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Codes of Ethics in Advertising), the judge concluded that ―the so-
called comparative advertising is not mala in se nor mala 
prohibita.‖77  Citing existing case law (Rolex, Navarro Correas, 
and Axoft), the court concluded that comparative advertising is not 
legally prohibited in Argentina.
78
 
 [L]egal comparative advertising, insofar as it does 
not degrade nor harm with false statements the 
products and services of the competition, does not 
fall under the sanctions of any legal provision.  On 
the other hand, if this kind of advertising makes 
affirmations or deceptive omissions, this kind of 
conduct can be considered bad faith and incur the 
generic sanction of Art. 953 of the Civil Code, 
which covers acts that are considered impossible, 
illegal, contrary to general customs or prohibited by 
law, or that oppose the freedom of actions or 
infringe the rights of a third party.
79
 
In this specific case, the judge concluded that there was no 
deceit because it was the consumer that chose the product, and 
many chose the plaintiff‘s, though a slight majority chose Pepsi.  
Neither the ―street‖ version nor the televised commercial contained 
any content that was disparaging or libelous about Coca Cola.  The 
judge reiterated that good faith is presumed and bad faith must be 
proven, and stated that in this case plaintiff did not prove bad 
faith.
80
 
Finally, the judge commented that the defendant brought forth 
video evidence of a variety of ads that Coca Cola had used in the 
United States, often comparing its product with Pepsi‘s using 
comparative advertising.
81
  The judge noted that Coca Cola‘s own 
 
 77 Coca Cola IV. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.  These included commercials which showed Pepsi cans that were disintegrating 
and referred to Pepsi products sarcastically, alluding to their ―sweet taste.‖  One 
advertisement was set on a deserted island.  A shipwrecked person saw a full bottle of 
Pepsi, opened and emptied it into the ocean in order to send a message and later saw 
bottles of Coca Cola arriving to the island, indicating that the person had requested Coca 
Cola in his message in the bottle. Id. 
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actions demonstrated that it did in other jurisdictions what it was 
trying to prohibit in Argentina.
82
  Thus, under a sort of estoppel 
doctrine, Coca-Cola was precluded from blocking this kind of 
advertising in Argentina. 
E. Procter & Gamble v. Clorox 
This case examined comparative advertisements for cleaning 
products. The defendant, Clorox, had started an advertising 
campaign consisting of three commercials for ―Trenet,‖ a stain-
removal product.  Clorox‘s competitor, Procter & Gamble, stated 
that the announcements made by Clorox disparaged its own 
product, ―Ariel,‖ a line of laundry detergent.83  Procter & Gamble 
also claimed that Clorox was using a similar format to the one it 
had used when promoting its own products: collecting testimonials 
from people presented as users of different cleaning products.
84
  
However, in one of Clorox‘s commercials a consumer interviewed 
declared that he would not purchase a soap when its commercial 
claimed that a stain-remover would be unnecessary.
85
 This 
statement by the consumer was a clear reference to the plaintiff‘s 
detergent and Procter & Gamble urged that the ad implied that 
there would be a disappointing result if its detergent were to be 
used. 
The case therefore considered the alleged disparaging 
comments made by Clorox about Procter & Gamble‘s Ariel 
detergent in Trenet‘s advertisements.86  Although it was presented 
as a case of defamation, an implied comparison between products 
formed the basis of the claim.
87
 
Procter & Gamble sought to cease the broadcasting of Clorox‘s 
advertisement because it disparaged the competitor by including 
the opinion of a supposed consumer who stated that he would not 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Javier F. Nuñez, La Publicidad Comparativa, ¿ Se encuentra Prohibida en nuestro 
Derecho?, J.A.,  2001-II-320. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. (It was a clear reference to the advertisement of the plaintiff, but the defendant‘s 
response was that it merely said the opposite of its opponents). 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at § 3.  
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buy soap that was advertised as not needing any stain-cleaner.
88
  
The court granted the petition with respect to one of the 
commercial announcements to which the plaintiff objected and 
ordered the defendant to cease its broadcast.
89
 
The court did not consider the defendant‘s intentions in 
creating the commercial to be determinative or even significant—
what had to be examined was whether the advertisement could 
reasonably have been construed as degrading the plaintiff‘s 
products.
90
  The court stated that the commercial contained a clear 
and specific reference to a detergent whose commercial mentioned 
that by using the detergent, stain-remover would be unnecessary.   
It was not, therefore, referencing just any detergent of the many 
that compete in the market, but was referring to the one that used 
this specific statement in its commercials.  Therefore, the court 
affirmed the lower court‘s decision banning the commercial.91 
The decisive factor for the lower court‘s decision was the 
defamatory quality of the commercial in question.  To the lower 
court, the commercial clearly degraded the defendant‘s product 
when the interviewed person said that he would not buy detergent 
which claimed not to need any stain-remover because it 
specifically alluded to the unsatisfactory performance of the 
defendant‘s product.92 
The court dismissed the plaintiff‘s other complaints, affirming 
the judge‘s decision to allow two other commercials.93  After 
analyzing both of these commercials, the court concluded that: (i) 
given the common nature of the so-called testimonial format, its 
use by the defendant to advertise its stain-remover Trenet 
constituted neither an illegal act nor an act of unfair competition; 
and (ii) the mere mention of the ineffectiveness—or, at least, the 
 
 88 Id. at § 1. 
 89 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal 
[CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital], 4/10/2000, ―Procter & Gamble Interamericas Inc. Sucursal Aregntina y otro c. 
Clorox S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-320). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
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lack of absolute effectiveness of the detergent‘s ability to remove 
stains or dirt from clothing was insufficient to constitute 
defamation.  ―Day-to-day experience proves that at present there is 
no soap or detergent that is perfectly capable of removing all 
potential stains that a piece of clothing may have.‖94 
Therefore, the other two commercials that did not specifically 
reference the defendant‘s advertisement did not reach the 
necessary requirements to be considered false or misleading. The 
court reasoned that nothing had been said relating to the 
effectiveness of Trenet; the statement that it must be used as a 
complement to detergent to remove stains does not qualify as 
defamation of all detergents, especially given that these other two 
advertisements did not specifically reference any of the numerous 
detergents in the market.‖95 
F. Kimberly Clark v. Procter & Gamble 
In this case, Kimberly Clark requested an injunction against 
Procter & Gamble‘s ―comparative advertising campaign‖ used to 
promote its sanitary pads ―Always Ultrafina con gel.‖  The 
injunction was meant to order Procter & Gamble to immediately 
interrupt the undertaking, broadcasting, exhibition and publication 
of the advertising campaign by any means.
96
 
The campaign consisted of placing stands in supermarkets 
with: i) an exhibition of signs in gondolas and dispensers with the 
phrase ―Always ultrafina con gel—6 times* cleaner and dryer‖, 
clarifying later ―*vs. other soft cloth pads‖; ii) the inclusion of 
stickers in packs of products; and iii) taking tests or demonstrations 
with the customers of the supermarkets which compared the 
promoted product with other, ―cheaper soft cloth pads,‖ with the 
object of proving the alluded superiority of the product.  The 
campaign also included a simultaneous television commercial and 
―inserts‖ in magazines and supermarket and pharmacy catalogs.  
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 23/12/2003, 
―Kimberly Clark Argentina S.A. c. Proctor & Gamble Argentina S.A. / derecho 
industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-1). 
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The graphic advertisements of the ―inserts‖ in magazines and 
catalogs only stated: ―6 times cleaner and dryer.‖97 
In both instances, the requested injunction was denied.
98
  The 
Court of First Instance declared that (i) the competitor‘s brand was 
not mentioned or alluded to in the advertisement and (ii) the 
procedural requisites for granting an innovative injunction were 
not met.
99
 
When the case reached the Court of Appeals, the judges 
reiterated the exceptional nature of the innovative injunction
100
 and 
stated that, following the doctrine established by the Navarro 
Correas case and its progeny,
101
 one must distinguish between 
different uses of one‘s trademark.  
[U]se without authorization of someone else‘s 
trademark as if it were one‘s own from the mere 
allusion or mention of the trademark while using 
another, owned brand; while in the first situation 
there would be an infringement of trademark law, 
the second situation would depend on the 
circumstances of each case, since the reference to a 
trademark owned by another can be considered a 
legitimate action as long as it is recognized to be 
owned by another and the aim is not to disparage or 
discredit it.
102
 
 
 97 Id. at § 5. 
 98 Id. at § 1. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at § 2. (―Innovative injunctions, given their special nature, require, in addition to 
the basic requisites for all injunctions, a fourth requisite, unique to this type, which 
consists of the possibility of an irreparable damage.‖). 
 101 See Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 30/12/1993, 
―Axoft Argentina S.A. c. Megasistemas S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1994-
C-8) (Arg.); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital], 22/03/1991, 
―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S.A. c. Agro Industrias Cartellone S.A.‖ L.L. 
1994-C-8 (Arg.) (noting the similar opinion of Judge Perez Delgado found in both cases). 
 102 See Navarro Correas, at § XXI.  
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For the court, this advertising campaign did not use someone else‘s 
trademark, nor was one mentioned or referenced.
103
 
The court concluded that no comparisons with a competitor‘s 
product had taken place to justify analyzing the existence of illegal 
comparative advertising.
104
  Regarding the graphic advertisement 
in the ―inserts‖ in magazines and catalogs indicating ―6 times 
cleaner and dryer,‖ the court determined that ―such a phrase could 
at first glance be perfectly understood to be referring to the launch 
of a new ―Always ultrafina with gel‖; in other words, the new 
―Always‖ is six times more absorbent than the previous model of 
the same brand, but not necessarily any other product.
105
  
Regarding the asterisk leading to the phrase ―vs. other soft cloth 
pads‖ inserted in the bottom part of the advertisement in small 
writing, the court declared:  
The phrase occupies a sufficiently minimal space in 
the design of the advertisement, in such a manner 
that it is, practically, not visible.  As a matter of 
fact, it took a while for the members of this court to 
locate it, since it went unnoticed when read in the 
natural manner of flipping through these types of 
magazines presented as evidence.
106
 
 The same conclusion was reached with regard to exhibiting 
signs in gondolas and ―dispensers‖ with the same phrase.  The 
court referred to the photographs taken in supermarkets and 
declared that it was impossible to notice the phrase ―*vs. other soft 
cloth pads‖ (which also appears in the supermarket stands).107  
Moreover, the court stressed two factors: (i) none of the products 
used by the promoters of ―Always‖ for the comparison were 
owned by the plaintiff‘s company; and (ii) the promoters made no 
references to Kimberly-Clark‘s trademarks.108 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 See Kimberly Clark, at § 9.  
 105 Id. at § 5. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at § 6. 
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As for the television commercial, the court concluded that the 
segment of the ad including the product comparison ―demo‖ with 
another sanitary pad lasted only six or seven seconds, making 
reading all the text that appeared on screen impossible.
109
  The 
court noted that there was a simultaneous voice off screen, 
followed by images that evidently distracted the consumer‘s 
attention.
110
  The court again focused on the lack of express 
reference made to the competitor in the television commercial:  
[T]he advertisement doesn‘t announce that the 
―Always‖ product absorbs 6 times better than the 
competitor‘s sanitary pads, but that it ―absorbs 6 
times more than you need to feel clean and dry.‖  At 
no point in time, therefore, is there a specific or 
hidden mention of the products of the petitioner of 
the injunction.
111
 
The court also rejected the claim that the statement made in the 
advertisement relating to the ―six times better‖ absorption power 
could be considered deceitful.  For the court, the determination of 
this fact, with the intent to prohibit the right of the defendant to 
advertise its products, clearly exceeded the limited scope of the 
injunction.
112
  Hypothetically, the court added that the comparison 
 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id.  The Court of Appeals clarified that:  
[T]he mention of ―other soft cloth sanitary pads‖ in the different 
forms of advertising are so marginal that not only does it not hold up 
in a valid manner that we are dealing with a case of degrading and 
misleading comparative advertising, but that it is difficult to establish 
a concrete comparison that indeed are not done specifically with the 
products or trademarks of the plaintiff.  Under these conditions, the 
Court considers that the challenged advertisement does not intend to 
degrade nor discredit the plaintiff‘s trademarks. 
Id.  
 112 Id. at § 8.  The plaintiff brought a report made by a technical consultant to the court, 
which was made using techniques and materials provided by the plaintiff.  Following the 
doctrine established in previous cases, the Court concluded that:  
[T]he pretense of trying to prohibit an advertisement on the basis of 
an alleged deceit to the consumers is inadmissible, especially 
considering it is based on a report made by an expert out of reach of 
the defendant and that the defendant was not even heard in court on 
the matter.‖ 
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between products would exist if, beyond their distinct 
characteristics, they satisfied the same needs and had the same 
objective.
113
  The court cited art. 3bis of the then Council Directive 
84/450/EEC, modified by Directive 97/55/EC,
114
 as an illustrative 
source for this affirmation.  The ruling concluded with a summary 
of the jurisprudence on comparative advertising.
115
 
G. Quilmes v. Isenbeck 
This case concerned two beer manufacturers: Quilmes, with an 
80% share in the beer market in Argentina, and Isenbeck, with 
approximately only a 7% market share.
116
  In May 2004, one 
month before the Soccer World Cup, Isenbeck started a campaign 
of graphic and television ads, taking advantage of the fact that 
Quilmes was the official sponsor of the Argentine National soccer 
team but had just agreed to sell part of its holding company to the 
Brazilian consortium manufacturer of Brahma beer.
117
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Id. 
 113 Id. 
114  Directive 97/55/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 
1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC Concerning Misleading Advertising so as to 
Include Comparative Advertising, 1997 O.J. (L 290) 
 115 Id. at § 9. 
 116 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2005, ―Cervecería  y  Maltería  Quilmes  v.  Casa  Isenbeck‖ 
(Quilmes III), Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (2005 III 365). 
 117 Id. 
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In the campaign, Isenbeck offered one of their own bottles for free 
in exchange for two bottle caps, one of their own beer and one of 
their competitor‘s, Quilmes.118  The special offer was accompanied 
by television ads that asked consumers to try both beers and 
compare the quality of the products.  The television and magazine 
ads kept changing on a weekly basis due to the injunctions 
Quilmes was obtaining.
119
 
Quilmes obtained two injunctions over a period of several 
weeks.
120
  The first one ordered the removal of all advertisements 
in which Quilmes was mentioned in any way.
121
  The court decided 
that the defendant lacked authorization by Quilmes to use the 
trademark in the questioned advertisement.
122
  The injunction was 
based directly on art. 10bis of the Paris Convention, because 
international treaties have direct effect in Argentina.
123
  In response 
to the injuction, Isenbeck decided to maintain its campaign (the 
exchange of a Quilmes bottle cap for a bottle of its own beer) and 
the advertisements with a slight change: Isenbeck replaced its 
competitor‘s name with a beep sound, in order to avoid using the 
trademark ―Quilmes‖ in its advertisement.124  In addition, Isenbeck 
aired some new advertisements.
125
 
Responding to the slight change, Quilmes obtained a second 
injunction from a different judge.  This one stated that the 
defendant had continued to use the Quilmes trademark in the 
advertisement on its website and that the mere substitution of the 
trademark with a sound (the beep) was inappropriate, given that 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 The complete TV ads can be seen at youtube.com by searching for the following: 
―Quilmes Isenbeck.‖ 
 120 The two rulings were: Juzgado Nacional de 1a Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial 
Federal Nro. 6 [National Court of First Instance in the Civil and Federal Commercial 
Jurisdiction, number 6], 8/6/2004, ―Cerveceria y Malteria Quilmes S.A. c. C.A.S.A. 
Isenbeck‖ (Quilmes I), La Ley [L.L.] (2004-D-378) (Arg.); and Juzgado Nacional de 1a 
Instancia en lo Civil y Comercial Federal Nro. 8 [National Court of First Instance in the 
Civil and Federal Commercial jurisdiction, number 8], 16/6/2004, ―Cervceria y Malteria 
Quilmes, Inc. c. C.A.S.A. Isenbeck‖ (Quilmes II), La Ley [L.L.] (2004-D, 657) (Arg.). 
 121 Quilmes I. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Art. 75.22, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.). 
 124 Quilmes II. 
 125 Id. 
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the public already associated the brand with the commercial.
126
  
However, the Court declined to fine Isenbeck for not respecting the 
previous injunction, because no disciplinary measure or monetary 
fine was imposed in the first injunction in case of a failure to 
comply.
127
 
Both parties appealed and the Court of Appeals issued an 
extensive ruling.
128
  There were three main issues decided in this 
case.  The first is related to the freedom of commercial expression 
and prior censorship.  The second refers to the existing limits to the 
use of another owner‘s trademark, a central theme in all the cases 
of comparative advertising.  The third details the normative 
guidelines drawn by the court to determine its legality or illegality.  
The court referred to the holding in the Navarro Correas case, 
considering it the starting point to determine whether legal 
comparative advertising exists.
129
 
Regarding the freedom of expression, the court concluded that 
there was no conflict with prior censorship because the commercial 
had already aired and therefore nothing was prohibited 
beforehand.
130
  However, the order imposed by the Court of First 
Instance was very broad as it prohibited future actions without 
analyzing these future commercials.
131
 Based on a prior 
comparative advertising case, the court would not allow an 
extension of the injunction because it would have constituted prior 
censorship.
132
 
Finally, regarding the guidelines used to judge comparative 
advertising, the court summarized previous cases and maintained 
that: (i) advertisements with commercial disparagement of 
competitors are inadmissible; (ii) advertisements containing 
 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Quilmes III. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, 
sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2001, ―Japan Tobacco Inc. y otro c. Massalin Particulares 
S.A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (2001-E-596) (Arg.) (resolving a similar issue regarding the limits 
of the injunction). 
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falsehoods and showing bad faith are inadmissible; (iii) 
advertisements must compare, in an objective manner, one or more 
essential, pertinent, and verifiable characteristics that represent 
those goods and services; and (iv) there can be no room for 
confusion in the market between an advertiser and a competitor, or 
between trademarks, commercial names, other distinctive symbols, 
or the goods and services of the advertiser and those of any 
competitor.
133
  The judges expressly justified this last statement by 
quoting the European Union Directive on comparative 
advertising.
134
 
The Quilmes case was also litigated in criminal court.  Quilmes 
filed a criminal complaint based on trademark infringement and 
unfair competition.  The criminal judges in both instances, citing 
jurisprudence from the civil and commercial courts (especially 
Navarro Correas), maintained that one should distinguish between 
the use of another person‘s trademark as one‘s own and the mere 
reference (or use) of another person‘s trademark, and that the 
investigated conduct did not constitute a felony.
135
  The felony 
charge provided in art. 31 of the Trademark Law was denied on the 
grounds that trademark use as defined in the statute had to be 
fraudulent (with the intent to deceive), an element not present in 
this case. 
Finally, due to the new advertisements that Quilmes argued 
violated the injunctions, a criminal complaint was also filed 
alleging the felony of disobedience of a judicial order.  The court 
dismissed the complaint,
136
 holding:  
[W]hile it is true that the injunction was disobeyed 
in order to continue the advertisements, the actions 
that were taken were an exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression provided in art. 14 of the 
 
 133 Quilmes III. 
 134 Id. (citing Directive 97/55/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC Concerning Misleading Advertising so as 
to Include Comparative Advertising, 1997 O.J. (L 290)). 
 135 See Unfair Competition and Its Judicial Control, in AD HOC 333–48 (Eduardo 
Favier Dubois & Guillermina Tajan eds., 2008) (containing the complete texts of the 
criminal cases discussed here).  
 136 Id. 
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National Constitution and art. 13 of the American 
Convention of Human Rights.  For this reason, 
granting the injunction would imply a state action of 
prior censorship since the prohibitive order would 
condition the exercise of the right by the party 
affected by the injunction.
137
 
H. Los Cipreses v. Lumary 
Los Cipreses S.A., a transportation company, sued Lumary 
S.A. for violating its trademark in a radio advertisement.  Until 
Lumary entered the market, Los Cipreses was the only company 
offering passenger transportation across the River Plate between 
Argentina and Uruguay
138
 under the trademark ―Buquebus.‖  The 
radio commercial featured the following conversation between an 
employee and a passenger: 
E: ―Attention, we would like to inform you that the 
boat has been delayed again.‖ 
P: ―Again . . . Listen, we‘ve been here since 7:30 in 
the morning, I can‘t believe this!‖ 
E: ―Look ma‘am, the ticket says it very clearly: the 
boat can be delayed 74 days without detriment to 
the company.‖ 
P: ―You know what . . . One day this monopoly of 
yours will end!‖ 
E: ―Oh . . . Our monopoly will end (sound of 
laughter). . .  Let‘s see, wait a moment while I put 
you on speaker. Carlos, listen to this . . . Let‘s see, 
ma‘am, repeat that please, go on.‖ 
This conversation was followed by the voice of a commentator 
who announced: ―Meet Colonia Express, a new high speed service 
to Uruguay aboard the most modern catamaran on the River Plate. 
Duty Free, Lounge bar and, most innovative of all, good customer 
service, because when we compete, you end up winning.‖ 
 
 137 Id.  
 138 Argentina and Uruguay are separated by the River Plate. See ERIN MCCLOSKEY, 
ARGENTINA 10 (2011).  
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The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition for an 
injunction, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and 
granted an injunction prohibiting the commercial.
139
 
The judge in the Court of First Instance stated that the right to 
an injunction must be evident from the material contained in the 
records of the case file.
140
  As a result, the lower court judge 
decided that, since the advertisement in question did not mention 
the name of the plaintiff‘s company, an injunction should not be 
granted.
141
   
Following the doctrine established in the Quilmes case, the 
Court of Appeals determined that the grant of an injunction in 
these cases does not imply ―prior censorship.‖142  Next, the Court 
reviewed the previous opinions in comparative advertising 
litigation to summarize the jurisprudential position.
143
 
The judges held that even though the trademark ―Buquebus‖ 
was not specifically mentioned, the advertisement was clearly 
referring to it, as it was the only public transport operator existing 
between the City of Buenos Aires and Colonia, Uruguay. 
Therefore, it was plausible to infer that, upon hearing the 
advertisement, the general public would make the association with 
―Buquebus.‖144 
Finally, the court noted that the advertisement in question was 
set in a ―Buquebus‖ office, where employees of the company 
mocked and mistreated a hypothetical passenger.
145
  The court 
concluded: 
 
 139 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal 
[CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
District], 26/6/2007, ―Los Cipreses S.A., c. Lumary S.A. / medidas cautelares,‖ 
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2007-III-267).  
 140 See id. at ¶ 1. 
 141 Further, the judge took into account the fact that the report of the naval expert-
witness regarding the characteristics of the defendant‘s catamaran could not be 
considered in proving the falsehood of the affirmation ―the most modern catamaran on 
the River Plate.‖ See id. 
 142 See id. at ¶ 5. 
 143 See id. at ¶¶ 5–6. 
 144 See id. at ¶ 8. 
 145 Id. 
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 [I]t is reasonable to infer the association the 
consumers would make with the plaintiff and, 
consequently, between this and the inconsiderate 
treatment of the client—with the unfortunate 
implications that derive from it—the act is prone to 
be detrimental to the legitimate rights of the owner 
of the referenced trademark—which turns out to be 
those of the unequivocally identifiable competitor—
by trying to discredit it. Consequently, the 
conclusion must be reached that said 
advertisement—at first glance—does not satisfy the 
ethical standard included in art. 953 of the Civil 
Code and also violates—through unfair 
competition—art. 10 of the Paris Convention . . . 
and therefore does not constitute a legitimate 
activity.
146
 
I. Laboratorios Bagó v. Bristol Myers Squibb 
In an advertising campaign for certain medicinal products 
created with the drug enalapril, the pharmaceutical company 
Bristol Myers Squibb produced a pamphlet exclusively for doctors 
that included comparisons between its prices and those of other 
brands.
147
  The pamphlet also stated that ―Unlike those that charge 
you anything . . . Versalion charges fairly‖ and that the product 
Kinfil was ―the best enalapril.‖148 
The price comparison included a product belonging to Bagó 
Laboratories (Glioten, also created with the drug enalapril).
149
  
Bagó filed a claim requesting a cessation of the use of its 
trademark, contending that this form of comparative advertising 
 
 146 Id.  
 147 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
2 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 2], 27/3/2009, ―Laboratorios Bagó S.A. c. Bristol Myers Squibb 
Argentina S.R.L.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (20357/2009), at section I. 
 148 Id.  
 149 Id.  
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was illegal because it exceeded the limits established by the 
ANMAT
150
 for the circulation of its products amongst doctors.
151
 
The judge of the Court of First Instance determined that no 
prohibition included in ANMAT Regulation 4980/2005 had been 
violated and declared the claim unfounded, dismissed it and 
imposed court costs.
152
  The Court of Appeals affirmed this 
decision.
153
 
The Court of Appeals based its ruling on the following: (i) the 
defendant‘s promotional pamphlets were distributed exclusively to 
doctors (so no confusion could be inferred);
154
 (ii) a phrase as 
general as ―the most convenient enalapril‖ does not degrade or 
constitute an act of unfair competition;
155
 (iii) comparative 
advertising does not abide by the trademark regime, ―. . . but if the 
manner in which it is done respects commercial loyalty and does 
not cause a legitimate prejudice to a third party, it is hard to find a 
reason that could prevent its use (as long as it does not imply 
taking advantage of another person‘s trademark, without 
authorization) . . .‖; 156 (iv) the fact that the defendant‘s 
advertisement includes a price comparison (mentioning the prices 
of each trademark) ―constitutes an informational resource that does 
not deserve reproach since the information included is objective 
and exact . . .‖;157 (v) supplying a table that contains a list of four 
products, with their market prices, and including one‘s own 
 
 150 The ANMAT (National Administration, Medicine, Foods and Medicinal 
Technology) is the entity that regulates pharmaceutical and food products.   
 151  Id. at 152 (since it was dealing with products sold with a prescription, the only 
advertising that is allowed is the one distributed to physicians, through the visiting 
doctors). 
 152 Laboratorios Bagó, at § II. 
 153 Id. at § III. 
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. at § IV. 
 156 This was the opinion by Judge Vocos Conesa, writing for the majoirty (―In general 
terms, I am not an advocate of authorizing ‗comparative advertising,‘ because experience 
dictates that, factually, it is common to use this procedure to praise the benefits of one 
product by taking advantage of the prestige of another.  It is very rare—I have never seen 
it—that a prestigious and well known trademark product would fall back on this method 
because, truthfully, it wouldn‘t need to.‖).  This is, however, a pretty absolute statement 
(which he later tempers) given the open evolution of comparative advertising. Id. 
 157 Id. at section V. 
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product, with its brand name and price, in no way violates the rules 
of the Trademark Law;
158
 and (vi) neither advertising technique 
constitutes excessive or abusive conduct that contravened the 
ANMAT regulations.
159
 
J. Kimberly Clark v. Topsy (Procter & Gamble) 
This case dealt with a campaign carried out in 1998 and 1999 
by a baby diaper manufacturer.  The campaign consisted of a live 
comparison of the absorption capabilities and longevity of its 
product (―Pampers Extra Sec‖) with those of the competition in 
stands placed in supermarkets.
160
  In the demonstration, a diaper of 
the promoting company and one of the supposed competitor (even 
though the brand name was not shown) was used.
161
  A blue liquid 
was poured on them to show the absorption and baby skin-
protecting power, drawing attention to the fact that the diaper of 
the advertiser featured a patented substance called ―dermacrem‖ 
that other diapers did not have.
162
  Kimberly-Clark, manufacturer 
of the ―Huggies Mimito Ultratrim‖ diaper, sued Topsy (later, also 
Procter & Gamble) and the advertising agency for illegal 
comparative advertising.
163
 
In both instances the claim was denied.
164
  The judge in the 
Court of First instance determined that the plaintiff lacked standing 
to act because it was not the registered owner of the trademark 
―Huggies.‖  The judge added—following the Navarro Correas 
holding—that there had not been a use of another owner‘s brand as 
one‘s own, no deceptive acts towards the general public, and no 
actions that disparaged the product identified with the brand 
 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id.  
 160 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 24/09/2009, ―Kimberly Clark Argentina S.A. c. Topsy S.A. y otro 
/ cese de uso de marcas‖ (Topsy II), (6042/1999) (Arg.). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id.; Juzcado Nacional de Primera Instancia, no. 9, secretary 18 [1a Inst.], 9/10/2008, 
―Kimberly Clark Argentina Inc., c. Topsy Inc‖ (Topsy I) (Arg.). 
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―Mimito.‖165  In his conclusions, the judge cited previous local 
comparative advertising cases and specifically mentioned 
European Directive 97/55/CE on comparative advertising to 
establish the legal framework applicable to the case.
166
  Finally, the 
judge stated that the damages the plaintiff claimed to have 
suffered, such as deception of clientele and lost prestige to the 
brand image, had not been proven.
167
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s decision.168  
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had standing because the 
appeal was grounded not only on the use of the trademark but also 
on illegal comparative advertising, which allows compensation for 
damages caused by an ―act of unfair competition‖ and that does 
not require the ownership of the trademark.
169
  However, regarding 
the question of law, the court noted that the campaign was 
designed without the clear identification of a specific competitor 
(the trademark of the diapers had been covered with black adhesive 
tape and no brand name was ever shown to the consuming 
public).
170
   
The ruling resembles the holding of the Navarro Correas case, 
which clarified that advertisements are illegal when a lack of fair 
trade is present, when the advertisement has been proven to 
contain a falsehood, or when it can be misleading.  None of these 
situations were present in this case.
171
  Furthermore, the court 
specifically highlighted the fact that the experts demonstrated that 
the affirmations made by the defendant were true: the Pampers 
diaper contained an emollient substance that other products 
lacked.
172
  Finally, the court alluded to the fact that it could not 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 24/09/2009, Topsy II, (6042/1999) (Arg.). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
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prove the deception of clientele in a manner that could be 
considered illegal.
173
 
K. The Gillette Company v. Energizer 
This case concerned two battery manufacturers—Duracell and 
Energizer.
174
  The advertisement published in major magazines 
depicted a group of six fantastical rabbits on one side—some of 
which were lying around, looking defeated—and on the other side, 
a battery with arms, legs, and the brand name ―Energizer,‖ which 
apparently won the tug-of-war competition between the rabbits and 
the personified battery.  At the upper part of the ad, a statement 
read: ―Energizer. Lithium up to 6 times longer than Duracell‖ and, 
underneath that, in smaller writing, clearer and centered it 
continued: ―common in digital cameras.‖175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Similar battles between battery manufacturers have taken place in other parts of the 
world with different outcomes. See Energizer Holdings, Inc., v. Duracell, No. 01 C 9720, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9313 at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2002); Gillette Austl. Pty. Ltd. v 
Energizer Austl. Pty. Ltd. [2005] FCA 1647 (Austl.); Energizer N.Z. Ltd. v Panasonic 
N.Z. Ltd. (unreported) High Court, CIV-2009-404-4087, 16 November 2009, Allan J 
(N.Z.).  
 175 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y 
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, 
courtroom 1], 26/03/2009, ―Gillette Co. c. Energizar Arg. S.A. / incidente de apelación de 
medida cautelar‖ (Gillette II), [IJ-XXXIII-484, at 7] (Arg.).  
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Duracell was granted an injunction which was later affirmed.
176
  
In granting the injunction, the Court of First Instance noted that the 
conduct of the defendant appeared to be ―at odds with elemental 
moral laws of society.‖177 
The Court of Appeals held that the challenged advertisement 
could possibly injure the legitimate rights of the owner of the 
trademark by trying to create the idea that the product of the 
defendant is superior, based on an ―unacceptable‖ comparison (the 
allegory that the character of the plaintiff is defeated and that the 
batteries of the competitor ―last longer‖), so that the consumer 
cannot choose in a fully informed fashion.
178
  It also restated that a 
specific advertising strategy is the manifestation of freedom of 
expression and is granted constitutional protection, although this 
protection does not exempt those that develop advertising 
campaigns from complying with trademark law and fair trade 
laws.
179
  However, the court noted that comparative advertising is 
not considered illegal as long as (i) it does not injure the legitimate 
rights of the owner of the trademark it is referencing; (ii) the 
advertisement does not disparage or discredit the competitor‘s 
trademark; or (iii) it does not mislead the consumer.
180
 
Regarding this case, the court clarified that the use of small 
writing did not function as a disclaimer related to the main phrase 
of the ad (which refers to the idea that the battery lasts six times 
longer than the plaintiff‘s) and concluded that ―from the 
challenged ad there emerged no comparison with sufficient clarity 
that could not refer to homogenous products, in such a manner that 
the consumer can make a fully informed decision; in other words, 
the resulting impression is the comparison of equivalent 
 
 176 Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia [1a Inst.] [National Court of First Instance], 
16/12/2008, ―Gillette Co. c. Energiza Arg. S.A., / incidente de medida cautelar‖ (Gillette 
I), [12071/2008] (Arg.), aff’d, Gillette II.  
 177 Gillette I. 
 178 Gillette II, at 7 (―In such conditions, it is possible to conclude that the publicity 
objected to—in principle—is likely to injure the legitimate rights of the holder of the 
mark mentioned without authorization by trying to establish the idea that its product of is 
superior . . .‖).  
 179 Id. at 5 (―However, a particular advertising strategy is a manifestation of the 
freedom of expression and gains constitutional protection.‖). 
 180 Id. 
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products.‖181  The court found support for its conclusions in 
European laws about misleading commercial publicity.
182
  The 
court also noted that ―Energito‖ is an emblematic character of the 
defendant‘s trademark and easily recognizable by the consumers 
that are the targets of the advertisement.
183
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINE CASE LAW 
A comparison of the cases from the 1970s with more recent 
cases shows that the Argentine courts have been leaving behind a 
formerly strict criterion of Trademark Law that prohibited the use 
of someone else‘s trademark, and are instead choosing to lean 
more strongly on principles of unfair competition.  This evolution 
demonstrates how the principles of European Union Law and the 
EU Directive that specifically regulates the subject matter have 
begun to filter into judicial decisions;
184
 the last five cases 
specifically cite European Community Law.
185
 
Of the seventeen resolved cases in Argentine jurisprudence, 
only eight were trials that ended with firm rulings on the question 
 
 181 The Court specified that:  
[T]he integral observation of the described advertisement shows that 
the clearly dominant portion of the text mentioned is in the forefront, 
given the typography, size and placement.  In effect, contrary to what 
is maintained by the appellant, in terms of the general consumer—to 
whom the advertisement is obviously targeted—what is of smaller 
size and highlighted less acquires less importance. 
Id. at 7.  
 182 Id. (―Consequently, the notice in question does not provide sufficient clarity that the 
comparison is not between homogenous products such that the consumer can make a 
fully informed choice.‖). 
 183 Id..  Unlike their American campaigns, in Argentina Energizer uses a humanized 
battery as a mascot, while Duracell uses a pink bunny as a mascot.    
184  The sources of these judicial rules are art. 10 of the Paris Convention, art. 953 of the 
Civil Code, and art. 3bis of the European Directive on Comparative Advertising. 
 185 In addition to citing the Directive on Comparative Advertising in some cases, a 
reference has been also made to the then draft Directive on unfair commercial practices. 
This Directive was finally approved in the year 2005 and does not specifically deal with 
comparative advertising, but does deal with deceptive trade practices. See EU DIRECTIVE 
2005/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, Of Journal. 11.6.2005. 
  
2012] COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING IN ARGENTINA 693 
of law.
186
  Of those eight cases, six denied the existence of any 
illegal activity and only two ruled that there had been an abuse, by 
degrading the competitor (Axoft v. Megasistemas) or because the 
advertisement simply did not pass the ethical standard contained in 
art. 953 of the Civil Code and the rules about fair trade or unfair 
competition (Rolex v. Orient).  Of the injunction cases, nine 
prohibited comparative advertisements, but three of these were 
overruled on appeal.
187
 
All of the cases depart from the clear distinction established in 
Navarro Correas between the mere reference (or descriptive use) 
of another person‘s trademark and the use of a competitor‘s 
trademark that infringes trademark law.  In some way, the Navarro 
Correas decision validates the use of distinguishing signs and 
symbols of a competitor, as long as it does not violate trademark 
law, achieving the effect that in practice the limits of said uses are 
imposed by the unfair competition regulations: prohibiting 
defamatory, disloyal, subjective, and bad faith uses. 
The rulings after the Navarro Correas case went on to specify 
and determine when these requirements were met.  In this manner, 
Argentine jurisprudence—due to lack of written law—has over 
time been creating and applying rules about unfair competition to 
regulate comparative advertising. 
The rules established by the Courts can be summarized in the 
following manner: 
1. Comparative advertising is not illegal.  The mere act of 
using another person‘s trademark is not illegal per se if it is 
referenced as the trademark of said person.
188
 
 
 186 The others only dealt with the issue of injunctions. It is difficult to compare 
injunctive rulings with final rulings on the merits, because the legal analysis is richer in 
cases that reach the merits.  
187  In Coca Cola v. Pepsi, this was for procedural reasons, so the Surpreme Court did 
not reach the merits. Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la 
Capital Federal, sala II [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial 
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 2], 22/10/93, ―Coca Cola I‖, La Ley [L.L.] 
(1994-C-3) (Arg.). 
188  Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 
1, [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 23/3/1991, ―Bodegas J. Edmundo Navarro Correas S. A. c. Agro 
Industrias Cartellone S. A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1991-C-531) (Arg.). 
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2. The trademark must be clearly mentioned in the 
advertisement to be illegal.  If the competitor‘s trademark doesn‘t 
appear mentioned, then there is, in principle, no comparative 
advertising.
189
 
3. The fleeting appearance of a trademark in a commercial 
would not imply a trademark use.
190
 
4. In some cases the reference to a competitor can be inferred 
when there is no doubt as to the identity of the competitor in the 
market, because it is a notorious fact or by a suggestive mention 
made in the commercial or in its context.
191
 
 
189  Navarro Correas; Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Penal Económico de la 
Capital Federal, sala A [CNPenal Económico] [National Court of Economic Criminal 
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom A], 13/04/2011, ―Grupo Bimbo Sociedad 
Anonima de Capital Variable S.A. y Compañía de Alimentos Fargo S.A. s/ Infraccíon a 
La Ley 25.156,‖ (Causa No. 61.184 Folio No. 012 Orden No. 26.993) (Arg.); Cámara 
Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y 
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, 
courtroom 1], 13/6/1996, ―Demibell S.A. c. Deville S.R.L.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (1997-B-67) 
(Arg.); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, 
sala 3 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 3], 27/9/2000, ―Clorox Argentina S.A. c. Unilever de Argentina 
S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-327); Juzcado Nacional de Primera 
Instancia, no. 9, secretary 18 [1a Inst.], 9/10/2008, ―Topsy I‖ (Arg.); Cámara Nacional de 
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 
30/06/2005, ―Clorox Argentina S.A. c. Reckitt Benckiser Argentina S.A. s/medidas 
cautelares‖ Citar Lexis (7/15825); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y 
Comercial [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the 
Federal Capital], 23/12/2003, ―Kimberly Clark Argentina S.A. c. Proctor & Gamble 
Argentina S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-1). 
190  Navarro Correas; Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la 
Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial 
Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 19/04/2001, ―Gougenheim S.A. c. Bimbo 
de Argentina S.A.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2003-I-469). 
191  Coca Cola v. Pepsi (presumption that the covered up bottle in Pepsi‘s commercial 
was Coca Cola‘s); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital 
Federal, sala 2 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the 
Federal Capital, courtroom 2], 24/02/2000, ―Unilever de Argentina S.A. c. Procter & 
Gamble Interamericas Inc.,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-318) (reference 
made to a bar of soap unique in the market); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil 
y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and 
Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2001, ―Japan Tobacco 
Inc. y otro c. Massalin Particulares S.A.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] (2001-E-596) (Arg.) (emerging 
from a previous advertisement and the content to which the competitor‘s advertisement 
refers); Los Cipreses v. Lumary (Buquebus was the sole competitor with ferries crossing 
the River Plate); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital 
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5. What the law forbids is the use of a third party’s brand as if 
it was one’s own, but it does not prohibit use in order to compare 
products.
192
 
6. An advertisement must not try to disparage or discredit the 
trademark of a competitor, be deceitful, or spread or allow the 
inference of falsehoods.
193
 
7. There is no defamation in phrases that make general or true 
statements or actions in which the consumer chooses.
194
 
 
Federal [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the 
Federal Capital], 4/10/2000, ―Procter & Gamble Interamericas Inc. Sucursal Aregntina y 
otro c. Clorox S.A. / derecho industrial,‖ Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (2001-II-320) 
(an interviewed consumer made a reference to no longer buying the detergent which he 
specified by its unique advertisement); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y 
Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and 
Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 1], 14/6/2005, ―Quilmes III‖, 
Jurisprudencia Argentina [JA] (2005 III 365) (replacing the brand ―Quilmes‖ with a 
―beep‖ in the commercial is insufficient); Gillete v. Energizer (the rabbits in the 
commercial represented the well known Duracell mascot). 
192  Navarro Correas. 
193  Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 [CNCiv. y 
Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, 
courtroom 1], 30/12/1993, ―Axoft Argentina Inc. c.  Megasistemas, Inc.,‖ La Ley [L.L.] 
(1994-C-8) (Arg.) (comparing only certain characteristics and fraudulently omitting 
others of the plaintiff‘s software that the defendant knew due to being its previous 
distributor for several years); Procter & Gamble v. Clorox (an interviewed consumer 
stated in an advertisement that purchasing the soap whose ads say it will be unnecessary 
to use stain removers will no longer be required); Quilmes v. Isenbeck (a reference to the 
idea that the competitor‘s beer is not 100% beer); Juzgado Nacional de Primera Instancia 
[1a Inst.] [National Court of First Instance], 16/12/2008, ―Gillette I‖, [12071/2008] 
(Arg.), aff’d, Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala 1 
[CNCiv. y Com.] [National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal 
Capital, courtroom 1], 26/03/2009, ―Gillette II‖, [IJ-XXXIII-484, at 7] (Arg.) (the mascot 
of the defendant appears defeated by the rabbits of the plaintiff). 
194  Demibel v. Deville (famous model states in a new commercial that she now uses a 
new brand of underwear after being the competition‘s model for several years); Coca 
Cola v. Pepsi (consumers taste drinks in street stands and then share the results); Procter 
& Gamble v. Clorox (the mere mention of the insufficiency of the soaps or detergents to 
remove stains is not degrading); Gougenheim v. Bimbo (saying ―Bimbo is very fresh‖ is 
not degrading to ―Fargo, the bread of day‖); Japan Tobacco v. Massalin (saying that the 
plaintiff‘s product is from a specific country is not defamatory); Cámara Nacional de 
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial de la Capital Federal, sala 2 [CNCiv. y Com.] 
[National Court of Civil and Commercial Appeals of the Federal Capital, courtroom 2], 
27/3/2009, ―Laboratorios Bagó S.A. c. Bristol Myers Squibb Argentina S.R.L.,‖ 
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (20357/2009) (reference included in a pamphlet to ―the 
best,‖ ―the most convenient enalapril,‖ ―the number one,‖ is not degrading to the 
competitor‘s product, just as comparing prices is not illegal). 
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8. Only when there is bad faith is comparative advertising 
illegitimate, but to prove bad faith a falsehood must be accredited 
in the advertisement.   
9. In addition, the confrontation must be between homogenous 
products and characteristics, while also being true and fair, which 
requires that it be executed in equal conditions for all products 
subjected to the comparison. 
10. The advertisement has to objectively compare one or more 
essential, pertinent, and verifiable characteristics that represent 
those goods and services.  There can be no room for confusion in 
the market between the advertiser and a competitor; or between 
trademarks, trade names, or other distinguishable symbols or signs; 
or between the goods and services of the advertiser and those of a 
competitor.
195
 
CONCLUSION 
In Argentina, there are clear jurisprudential rules based on 
unfair competition law.  If in some manner an advertisement is 
proven to be unfair or exceeds ethical standards by hiding the truth 
or omitting some essential aspect of the comparison, it is probable 
that an injunction will be granted and that the plaintiff will be able 
to obtain a final decision declaring the advertisement illegal. 
By following the requirements of the European Union 
Directive on comparative advertising and other international 
precedent, Argentine courts have developed standards very similar 
to European regulation.  The judges seemingly wished to validate 
the judicially-created rules with some external source of codified 
law.  The general holdings of the Argentine courts are consistent 
with similar conclusions reached elsewhere indicating the 
existence of a universally accepted principle that comparing 
products in commercial advertisements should be lawful. 
 
 
 195 See Council Directive 97/55, 1997 O.J. (L 290) (EC). 
